MBE Practice Questions

How to work each question

Read the call of the question first, identify the legal issue, and state the governing rule before looking for a matching answer. After selecting an answer, explain why each alternative is wrong. That review step matters: a correct choice reached by guessing does not show reliable rule knowledge.

Question 1: present sense impression

A pedestrian is struck by a car. Seconds later, a bystander calls emergency services and says, ‘The blue sedan just ran the red light and hit the pedestrian.’ The caller does not testify. The pedestrian offers the recording to prove that the blue sedan ran the red light. Which is the best answer?

• A. The statement is admissible as a present sense impression if the declarant described the event while perceiving it or immediately afterward.
• B. The statement is admissible as an excited utterance only if the caller personally knows the driver.
• C. The statement is not hearsay because it was made to emergency services.
• D. The statement is admissible as a business record because emergency services recorded it.

Answer: A. The declarant's statement is offered for its truth, so it is hearsay unless an exclusion or exception applies. A present sense impression covers a statement describing or explaining an event made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it. The facts provide close timing. A is the best answer, though authentication and other applicable rules would still need to be satisfied in a real case.

B adds an unnecessary requirement: the declarant need not know the driver to describe what was perceived. C confuses the audience with the statement's truth-purpose. D misclassifies the recorded statement; the caller's words are an out-of-court layer, and an agency's recording does not automatically make the caller's assertion a business-record statement.

Question 2: acceptance by performance

A seller mails a signed offer to sell a unique machine for $8,000, stating that acceptance must be received by Friday. On Thursday, the buyer mails an unconditional acceptance. It arrives Monday. The seller had not revoked the offer. Under the common law mailbox rule, which is the best answer?

• A. No contract formed because the acceptance arrived after Friday.
• B. A contract formed when the buyer mailed the acceptance on Thursday.
• C. A contract formed only when the seller opened the letter.
• D. No contract formed because the machine is goods and only the UCC applies.

Answer: A. The offer expressly makes receipt by Friday necessary. The mailbox rule generally makes a properly dispatched acceptance effective on dispatch, but the offeror may specify that acceptance is effective only on receipt. The letter arrived after the stated deadline, so it was too late. B ignores the express condition. C is not the usual receipt rule; receipt does not wait until the offeror reads the communication. D identifies a separate issue: a sale of goods is generally governed by Article 2, but the question expressly asks for the common law mailbox rule and its stated rule controls this hypothetical.

Question 3: scope of liability

A warehouse leaves a heavy crate unsecured on a loading platform beside a public walkway. A gust of wind knocks it onto a passerby, breaking her wrist. At the hospital, a physician negligently delays treatment, causing the fracture to heal more slowly. The warehouse argues that the physician's negligence eliminates all liability. Which is the best answer?

• A. The warehouse has no liability because a medical professional later treated the passerby.
• B. The warehouse may be liable for the original injury and foreseeable aggravation caused by ordinary negligent treatment.
• C. The warehouse is liable only if it controlled the hospital.
• D. The warehouse is liable for the aggravation only if it predicted the physician's precise mistake.

Answer: B. The unsecured crate created a foreseeable risk of physical injury. A tortfeasor ordinarily remains responsible for foreseeable consequences of the injury, including ordinary negligent medical treatment that aggravates it. The defendant need not predict the precise medical error. A treats later negligence as automatically superseding; C invents an employment or control requirement; D demands a level of specificity foreseeability does not require.

Turn misses into study

For each item, write the rule in one sentence and name the fact that activates it. Then record why your chosen distractor seemed attractive. If you missed Question 1 because the recording sounded official, review the distinction between a record and the statement contained inside it. If you missed Question 2, practise identifying when an offer changes the ordinary acceptance rule. If you missed Question 3, separate factual causation from scope of liability and superseding cause.

Repeat a missed doctrine later with a different fact pattern. Memorizing the answer letter or the exact narrative is not transferable learning. Track accuracy by doctrine and timing, but treat these three questions as a narrow sample rather than a readiness estimate.

Question 4: personal jurisdiction and waiver

A plaintiff sues an out-of-state defendant in federal court. The defendant files a Rule 12 motion raising improper venue but omits lack of personal jurisdiction. After the court denies the motion, the defendant raises lack of personal jurisdiction in the answer. The defendant has no purposeful contacts with the forum. Is the defense preserved?

• A. Yes, because the defendant raised the defense in the answer.
• B. Yes, because the court lacks constitutional power over the defendant.
• C. No, because the defense was omitted from the defendant's first Rule 12 motion.
• D. No, because improper venue and personal jurisdiction are the same defense.

Answer: C. A personal-jurisdiction defense is waived if omitted from the first Rule 12 motion when such a motion is made. The defendant's lack of forum contacts may support the merits of the defense, but it does not undo the procedural waiver. A is incorrect because a later answer cannot revive a defense required to be raised earlier. D is incorrect because venue and personal jurisdiction are distinct.

Question 5: consideration and preexisting duty

A city contracts with a licensed electrician to repair streetlights for a fixed fee. Halfway through the work, the electrician demands an additional payment to complete the same repairs, citing no changed conditions. The city agrees. The electrician completes the work. Under common-law consideration principles, is the city's promise to pay more enforceable?

• A. Yes, because completing the repairs is a legal detriment.
• B. Yes, because the city received a benefit from the completed work.
• C. No, because the electrician promised only the performance already owed under the contract.
• D. No, because modifications are never enforceable at common law.

Answer: C. The electrician already had a contractual duty to perform the repairs, so repeating that promise supplies no new consideration absent a recognized exception or additional performance. A and B confuse detriment or benefit with bargained-for new consideration. D is too broad: common-law modifications may be enforceable when supported by new consideration or an applicable exception.

Question 6: Fourth Amendment consent and scope

A tenant tells officers they may search the shared living room of a home. The tenant's roommate is present and expressly objects. The officers nevertheless open the roommate's locked bedroom cabinet, where they find evidence. The cabinet is used exclusively by the roommate. May the evidence be admitted against the roommate based on the tenant's consent?

• A. Yes, because a co-occupant may consent to every part of a shared home.
• B. Yes, because the evidence was in plain view once the cabinet was opened.
• C. No, because the roommate expressly objected and the cabinet was exclusively controlled by the roommate.
• D. No, because police always need a warrant to search a home, even with consent.

Answer: C. The tenant's authority over shared space did not extend to the roommate's exclusive locked cabinet, and the physically present roommate expressly refused consent. A is wrong because common authority is limited by mutual use and control. B fails because the officers had to open the cabinet before the evidence became visible. D is wrong because valid voluntary consent can support a warrantless search within its scope.

Question 7: future interests and a condition

A grantor conveys “to Dana for life, then to Lee if Lee survives Dana; otherwise to Morgan.” At the time of the conveyance, Lee and Morgan are alive. Which interest does Lee hold?

• A. A vested remainder in fee simple.
• B. A contingent remainder because survival is a condition precedent.
• C. An executory interest because it will divest Dana.
• D. A possibility of reverter.

Answer: B. Lee's survival of Dana must occur before Lee's remainder can vest in possession, so survival is a condition precedent. Morgan holds the alternative contingent remainder. A is wrong because Lee's identity is certain but the condition remains unsatisfied. C is wrong because Lee's interest follows the natural end of Dana's life estate rather than cutting it short. D is retained by a transferor after a determinable fee, which the grant does not create.

Question 8: character evidence versus a nonpropensity purpose

A defendant charged with knowingly possessing stolen watches claims the defendant believed the watches were lawfully purchased. The prosecution offers evidence that, in a prior transaction, the defendant used a similar method to conceal the serial numbers on watches. The evidence is offered to show knowledge and absence of mistake. Is it admissible?

• A. No, because evidence of any prior act is inadmissible in a criminal case.
• B. Yes, if relevant to knowledge or absence of mistake and its probative value survives the required balancing.
• C. Yes, automatically, because the prior act is similar.
• D. No, unless the defendant first testifies.

Answer: B. A prior act may be admissible for a genuine nonpropensity purpose such as knowledge or absence of mistake, subject to relevance and unfair-prejudice balancing. Similarity may strengthen the inference but does not make admission automatic. A is too broad; C skips balancing and purpose; D is not a prerequisite to this type of evidence.

A repeatable review routine

For each item, write the rule in one sentence and name the fact that triggered it. Then explain why the closest distractor fails. If you missed Question 4, practise procedural preservation; if you missed Question 5, distinguish benefit from consideration; if you missed Question 6, identify the scope of another person's consent. Review according to the doctrine and reasoning error, not by repeating the same question until its answer is memorized.