Credit Rating Conflicts of Interest: HKSI Paper 4
The SFC CRA Code requires written procedures to identify, eliminate or manage and disclose actual or potential conflicts that may affect ratings or analysts.
- It bars contingent fees, restricts certain advisory work for rated entities, and requires specified public compensation disclosures, including when a single source reaches the Code’s 5% revenue threshold.
On this page9 sections
- Find the source of the conflict
- Fee arrangements and who pays
- Apply the Code’s 5% revenue disclosure threshold precisely
- Ancillary services can create a separate conflict
- Analyst interests and compensation
- Disclosure is specific, not boilerplate
- Worked scenario: one client is 6% of revenue
- Worked scenario: fee depends on the rating
- A conflict-question decision tree
Find the source of the conflict
Conflict questions on HKSI Paper 4 are easier when you separate four things: the relationship, its route of influence, the control, and the required communication. The relevant relationship may involve a rated entity, issuer, arranger, subscriber, CRA affiliate, analyst, committee member or other employee. The route of influence may be a rating-linked fee, client concentration, an advisory engagement, a personal investment or a supervisor’s compensation. The SFC CRA Code expects the CRA to identify and address actual or potential conflicts that may influence its ratings or the judgment and analysis of representatives involved in preparing them.
A conflict does not prove that a rating is biased. It is a risk that must be controlled, and a firm should not wait until an analyst changes a rating before acting. Conversely, publishing a disclosure does not excuse actual improper influence. A strong exam answer explains what the conflict is and whether the selected safeguard addresses the way the influence could reach the rating decision.
- Written control
- Identify, eliminate or manage and disclose actual or potential conflicts that may influence ratings or analysis
- Disclosure standard
- Complete, clear, concise, specific, prominent and timely
- Contingent fees
- Not allowed for credit rating services under the CRA Code
- 5% revenue trigger
- Publicly disclose the party or parties if the Code’s defined single-source revenue threshold is met
- Restricted advisory work
- No consultancy/advice to a rated entity or related party about its corporate/legal structure, assets, liabilities or activities
Fee arrangements and who pays
An issuer-paid model creates a commercial incentive because the party rated, or a related transaction participant, may also pay for the rating service. The CRA Code does not treat that structure as proof that each rating is wrong. Instead, it imposes requirements designed to protect the analytical decision and explain commercial relationships to users. The CRA should not let a fee or the existence or absence of a business relationship affect the rating. Analysts directly involved in rating should not initiate or participate in fee discussions with entities they rate.
The distinction between an ordinary fee and a contingent fee is important. A contingent fee is calculated on a predetermined basis related to the result of a transaction or the result of the CRA’s services. A fee that increases if a rating reaches a target level creates direct pressure on the rating result and is prohibited by the CRA Code. By contrast, a fixed fee is not automatically acceptable in every circumstance, but it does not become contingent merely because it is paid by the rated entity. Other conflict and disclosure requirements still apply.
The Code also addresses compensation unrelated to the rating service. Where the CRA or a credit-rating affiliate receives compensation from a rated entity for other services, the CRA should publicly disclose the proportion that such compensation represents against the total fees received from that rated entity for ratings services. This lets readers understand that the relationship extends beyond the rating itself. The disclosure should reflect the required calculation rather than use vague wording such as “other services may be provided.”
Apply the Code’s 5% revenue disclosure threshold precisely
The CRA Code has a specific public-disclosure trigger for revenue concentration. If at least 5% of the CRA’s total annual revenue, or the combined annual revenue of the CRA and an affiliate that carries out credit-rating activities, comes from one issuer, originator, arranger, client or subscriber and/or any affiliate of one of those parties, the CRA should disclose the party or parties from which that revenue is received. This is not a universal 5% conflict test. It is a specified disclosure requirement with a defined revenue denominator and party group.
| Question to ask | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| Is the source one of the listed parties or its affiliate? | The Code names issuers, originators, arrangers, clients and subscribers, including affiliates. |
| Does the revenue reach 5% or more? | The threshold includes exactly 5%; it is not limited to amounts above 5%. |
| Which revenue base applies? | The CRA’s total annual revenue, or combined annual revenue with a CRA affiliate that conducts rating activity, as specified by the Code. |
| What must be disclosed? | The party or parties from which the relevant revenue is received, in a public disclosure. |
| Does being below 5% mean no conflict exists? | No. Other actual or potential conflicts still need identification and appropriate management or disclosure. |
A common exam trap is to treat the threshold as a safe harbor: “the client supplies only 4.9%, so no conflict process is needed.” That is not what the rule says. The threshold addresses one public disclosure requirement. A smaller client can still create a conflict because of a personal relationship, a contingent-fee proposal, ancillary consulting, a threat to move business, or another form of influence. Evaluate the full facts under the general conflict controls.
Ancillary services can create a separate conflict
The CRA Code expects the CRA to define ancillary business and explain why it does not reasonably have the potential to conflict with rating services. Procedures should minimize the chance of a conflict and identify one if it arises. The SFC’s CRA FAQ makes a firm boundary clear: a CRA must not provide consultancy or advisory services to a rated entity or its related party concerning that entity’s corporate or legal structure, assets, liabilities or activities.
Read the service description carefully. “We provide data” or “we hold a workshop” is not enough to classify a service. Determine whether the CRA is advising the issuer on the very structure, assets, liabilities or activities that its rating analysis evaluates. Also identify whether the customer is the rated entity or a related party. If the facts fit the prohibited advisory category, separation or disclosure alone does not make that service permissible. If the service is genuinely different, the CRA still needs to assess whether it creates a potential conflict and apply its defined controls.
Structured-finance products add another disclosure issue. The CRA Code encourages issuers and originators to disclose relevant information so investors and other CRAs can conduct independent analysis. Rating announcements should disclose whether the issuer has informed the CRA that all relevant information is being publicly disclosed or whether information remains non-public. This helps users assess whether they can independently scrutinize the product and the rating. It does not eliminate the CRA’s own need to analyze information carefully and communicate limitations.
Analyst interests and compensation
An employee conflict may arise from investments, family relationships, prior employment or other significant connections to a rated entity. The CRA Code restricts a representative or employee from participating in a rating when specified relationships may cause or be perceived to cause a conflict. It also addresses transactions by representatives, spouses or partners, minor children and controlled accounts involving securities related to the representative’s analytical area. The firm’s policies should cover declarations, restricted securities, escalation and reassignment.
Compensation and reporting lines matter because they can give an interested person leverage even without direct contact with the committee. The Code says the CRA should structure reporting lines and compensation to eliminate or effectively manage conflicts. Rating personnel should not be compensated or evaluated based on the revenue generated from issuers they rate or on the amount of rating fees received from those issuers. The CRA should maintain controls that work in practice, not simply a policy statement on a website.
Gifts or favors can compromise or appear to compromise objectivity. A staff member should follow the CRA’s rules on soliciting or accepting gifts from parties with whom the firm does business. An analyst who is assigned to rate a company should not treat a client-paid trip or hospitality as harmless because no rating has been finalized. Disclose the relationship and let the prescribed control function assess it before participating further.
Disclosure is specific, not boilerplate
When the CRA discloses conflicts, the Code calls for disclosure that is complete, clear, concise, specific, prominent and timely. These requirements describe quality, not just the existence of a notice. A generic footer buried in a report may not tell a reader what relationship matters. A useful disclosure identifies the nature of the relationship, the relevant parties, the safeguard and, where applicable, the financial information the Code requires.
Public disclosure and internal control serve different functions. An investor needs information to understand the relationship and the rating context. The CRA needs procedures to keep the relationship from changing the outcome. In a scenario question, do not substitute one for the other. If an issuer threatens to move its account unless the rating is higher, a paragraph about the CRA’s general conflicts policy does not neutralize the threat. The CRA should escalate, prevent commercial influence and document the rating committee’s independent analysis.
Worked scenario: one client is 6% of revenue
A single issuer and its affiliates supplied 6% of the CRA and rating affiliate’s combined annual revenue. The issuer is rated by the CRA and also receives a separate non-rating service. A candidate says that the only relevant action is to disclose the issuer’s name because the 5% trigger has been crossed. Is that enough?
No. The threshold means the CRA should publicly disclose the party or parties from which the relevant revenue is received. The separate non-rating compensation also calls for disclosure of the proportion of such compensation against the total rating fees received from that rated entity, as specified by the Code. Beyond those public disclosures, the CRA must assess the actual or potential conflict, define the service, apply controls and ensure the rating is not influenced. The 5% rule is not a substitute for those other requirements.
Worked scenario: fee depends on the rating
An issuer proposes a fixed fee for rating work and a bonus if the rating reaches a specified grade. A commercial employee says the bonus is simply a success fee and the committee can remain independent. What should the analyst identify?
The proposed bonus is tied to the result of the CRA’s services, so it falls within the Code’s description of a contingent fee arrangement. The CRA should not enter into that arrangement. A committee’s intention to remain objective does not make a prohibited fee structure permissible. The analyst should escalate the proposed term through the proper channel and should not negotiate a rating outcome in exchange for a payment.
A conflict-question decision tree
- Identify the relationship and all parties, including affiliates and any third-party payer.
- Determine whether the conflict can influence the rating, committee, analyst judgment, disclosure or ongoing surveillance.
- Check for a specific bright-line rule such as the ban on contingent fees or restricted advisory services.
- Apply the required calculation and public disclosure rule where a compensation or 5% revenue threshold is involved.
- Use controls suited to the risk: remove the conflicted analyst, change reporting lines, use independent review, restrict access, escalate or decline the work where required.
- Document the analysis and ensure disclosure is timely and specific. Revisit the control if the relationship or revenue share changes.
Common questions
Is a 5% client-revenue share the only conflict threshold?
No. The 5% threshold is a specified public-disclosure trigger in the CRA Code. Other actual or potential conflicts must still be assessed even below that level.
Can an issuer pay a CRA for a rating?
An issuer-paid arrangement is not automatically proof of a biased rating, but the CRA must preserve independence, manage conflicts and make required disclosures. Contingent fees tied to a transaction outcome or rating-service result are prohibited.
Can a CRA offer consulting to a rated issuer?
The SFC states that a CRA must not advise a rated entity or related party on its corporate or legal structure, assets, liabilities or activities. Other ancillary services need conflict assessment under the CRA Code.
Does disclosing a conflict cure it?
No. Disclosure informs users, while internal controls address the influence. A conflict that can still affect the rating requires effective management or removal of the source of influence.